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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



ENDURING PARTNER CAPACITY: AFRICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS

by

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ENDURING PARTNER CAPACITY: AFRICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS


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
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This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Relating to the current operational environment and the United States government stated objectives to build partner-nation military capabilities; this thesis seeks to determine the potential value of supporting the development of civil affairs or civil military cooperation forces in African militaries to conduct military support to disaster relief and displaced civilian operations locally or regionally within AFRICOM area of responsibility. Specifically, this thesis answers whether civil affairs activities executed by African militaries will mitigate the destabilizing effects of natural disasters and reduce the necessity of U.S. or allied forces to respond to these events. The current and near-term fiscal constraints on U.S. and allied nations reduce the ability to respond to the numerous natural disasters that occur globally and specifically in Africa. U.S. military will not only see a reduction in manpower, but also in military platforms to execute operations. While responding to natural disasters is a top priority for the nations affected or near the affected area, it at times can be a lower priority for other nations. With a limited number of personnel and platforms the U.S. and its allies must prioritize its operations to focus on larger national security threats. Likewise, for long-term stability in Africa, it will require that African nations and their militaries demonstrate the capacity to execute Disaster Relief and Dislocated Civilian operations. Africans executing these types of operations successfully mitigate the effects of these emergency situations and demonstrate to the African population that their own militaries are a viable and stabilizing force within their nation and region.

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INTRODUCTION

Research Question

Relating to the current operational environment and the United States government stated objectives to build partner-nation military capabilities; this thesis seeks to determine the potential value of supporting the development of civil affairs or civil military cooperation forces in African militaries to conduct military support to disaster relief and displaced civilian operations locally or regionally within AFRICOM area of responsibility. Specifically, this thesis answers whether civil affairs activities executed by African militaries will mitigate the destabilizing effects of natural disasters and reduce the necessity of U.S. or allied forces to respond to these events.

Relevance

The current and near-term fiscal constraints on U.S. and allied nations reduce the ability to respond to the numerous natural disasters that occur globally and specifically in Africa. The U.S. military will not only see a reduction in manpower, but also in military platforms to execute operations. While responding to natural disasters is a top priority for the nations affected or near the affected area, it at times can be a lower priority for other nations. With a limited number of personnel and platforms the U.S. and its allies must prioritize its operations to focus on larger national security threats. Likewise, for long-term stability in Africa, it will require that African nations and their militaries demonstrate the capacity to execute Disaster Relief and Dislocated Civilian operations. Africans executing these types of operations successfully mitigate the effects of these emergency situations and demonstrate to the African population that their own militaries are a viable and stabilizing force within their nation and region.

Background

Natural disasters occur frequently on the African continent and in many cases have a disproportional impact on the African population. One can see in Figure 1 the impact of natural disasters from the period 1971-2000. Given these out of balance impacts on the African population, the new AFRICOM Commander General Ham addressed, disaster response as an explicit priority within his Commander's Intent and states, "African authorities are adequately supported to prevent mass atrocities and to mitigate the consequences of catastrophic events."¹




Figure 1 USFDA Natural Disaster Chart

Natural disasters have immediate impacts on the population such as death, injury and destruction of food supplies and homes. The secondary impact of these natural disasters comes when the population cannot physically recover quick enough in the affected area and begins to

¹ Headquarters, United States Africa Command, *General Ham Commander's Intent*, (Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, August 2011), www.africom.mil (accessed October 6, 2011).

fear for its survival. Once this occurs, particularly in Africa, people relocate. The migratory traditions within Africa have popularized Africa as a “continent perpetually on the move.”²

The vulnerable populations of Africa can exacerbate the impact of natural disasters. When large populations migrate out of a natural disaster impact area to another area little deference is given to the recognized borders of adjoining nations. Africans move either in traditional patterns, as is seen currently in Somalia as people have migrated to northern Kenya, or as far as necessary in a new direction to obtain the safety and security they desire. These population shifts are destabilizing to the receiving nation. The migrants, henceforth referred to as Dislocated Civilians (DCs)³, require immediate basic life support to include medical attention, food, water and shelter. In many cases it becomes the immediate responsibility of the nation who received these DCs to provide this care. Unless these nations already have the capabilities

² Jonathan Baker and Tade Akin Aina, eds., “The Migration Experience in Africa,” *African Affairs*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 622.

³ “DCs are civilians who have left their homes. Their movement and presence can hinder military operations. They will likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. DCs may not be indigenous to the area or to the country in which they reside. DC is a generic term further subdivided into eight categories. These categories are defined by legal and political considerations as follows: Displaced Person: A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. Refugee: A person outside of his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol). Evacuee: A civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. Stateless Person: Civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed. War Victim: A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes as a result of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act. Internally Displaced Persons: Any persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (UN definition contained in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement). Returnee: Either a refugee or an IDP who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence. Resettler: Subset of IDP or refugee – civilian wishing to return somewhere other than previously owned home or land within the country or area of original displacement,” U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, September 2006) p 1-2.

in place or have Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on the ground in the area, the situation will result into chaos.

African nations ability to respond to these disasters continues to increase and in many nations the capability to respond would appear to be sufficient. However, not all nations have equal capabilities and the nations with poor response mechanisms can have a great impact on neighboring nations. The migration and displacement of people out of disaster areas can create instability in these neighboring nations and is an inhibitor of long-term growth, development and stability in Africa. The African Union attempts to mitigate these potentially destabilizing events through a loose coalition of regional partners. These regional groups of nations can assist less capable nations within their region to respond to disasters and prevent destabilizing migration. A significant enabler to the civil military response process for these events, are Civil Affairs (CA) military forces. Civil Affairs forces are not part of the force structure of most African militaries, but would be a great addition.

Developing the Civil Affairs forces in our African partner nations would likewise provide a number of benefits to the U.S. and our allies. If effective CA forces can be developed in African militaries it would have several positive outcomes. First, it would provide increased stability in Africa by mitigating the effects of what is an endless parade of natural disasters that occur in Africa. Additionally, it would decrease the requirement for outside support from U.S. and European nations.

African Partner Nation Force Development

The 2011 U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) outlines the importance of using the U.S. military to grow and sustain viable partners in Africa,

Our Nation continues to embrace effective partnerships in Africa. The United Nations and African Union play a critical role in humanitarian, peacekeeping and capacity-building efforts, which help preserve stability, facilitate resolutions to political tensions that underlie conflicts, and foster broader development. To support this, the Joint Force will continue to build partner capacity in Africa.⁴

Working with the African Union the U.S. has developed a framework for providing military training through AFRICOM. One very successful method of partner nation capacity building can be seen in the U.S. Army National Guard State Partnership Program. Under the guidelines of this program, U.S. State National Guards have signed up to provide military to military training to specific African nations, creating an enduring military relationship.⁵

All Geographic Combatant Commands have structured their implementation of the NMS objectives differently, but focusing on AFRICOM demonstrates that General Ham envisions Partner Nation capacity building as a guiding principle for his strategy in AFRICOM. General Ham states, “Over the long run, it will be Africans who will best be able to address African security challenges and that AFRICOM most effectively advances U.S. security interests through focused security engagement with our African partners.”⁶ He sees this capacity building as one of his most important military tasks,

Strengthen the defense capabilities of key African states and regional partners. Through enduring and tailored engagement, help them build defense institutions and military forces that are capable, sustainable, subordinate to civilian authority, respectful of the rule of law, and committed to the well-being of their fellow citizens. Increase the capacity of key states to contribute to regional and international military activities aimed at preserving peace and combating transnational threats to security.⁷

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy*, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2011), 12.

⁵ Department of the Army, “National Guard Program boosts AFRICOM,” (Mar 2010), <http://www.army.mil/article/35740/> (accessed on 28 Sep 2011).

⁶ USAFRICOM, “General Ham’s Commander’s Intent,” 2011.

⁷ Ibid, 1.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn Of Africa (CJTF-HOA) a subordinate task force to AFRICOM, details in their mission statement the importance of Partner Nation capacity building in their AOR, "Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa conducts operations in the Combined Joint Operations Area to enhance partner nation capacity, promote regional stability, dissuade conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition interests."⁸

The strategy to develop African Partner Nation military capabilities is nested and unambiguous from the strategic to the tactical level. However, the challenges in implementation of this strategy are reflective of the unique geography, demographics, political and social dynamics of each African region and Nation. Africa has 54 Nations spread over 11 million square miles, with over 1,000 languages and over 1 billion inhabitants.⁹ The scope of this environment requires one to examine strategy in terms of regions to assist in creating a manageable operating environment. AFRICOM dissects Africa into five regions North, South, East, West and Central.¹⁰ These regions are the basic regional groupings used by many academic communities to facilitate research, and are depicted in Figure 2.

⁸ CJTF-HOA, "Mission Statement," <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/>, (accessed October 6, 2011).

⁹ Public Broadcasting System, "Africa," <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/africa/>, (accessed October 6, 2011).

¹⁰ USAFRICOM, "Headquarters, U.S. Africa Command Organization Chart," <http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOM%20Org%20Chart.pdf>, (accessed October 6, 2011).




Figure 2 Regions of Africa¹¹

Civil Affairs Forces

Once the feasibility of CA force development is determined, this paper will examine two models of CA forces, U.S. Civil Affairs forces and NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) forces, to determine which would be most appropriate for each case study nation. Civil Affairs forces exist in three branches of the U.S. military, the Army, Marine Corps and the Navy. Due to the history and extensive operational experience of the U.S. Army CA forces along with their Joint proponentcy of CA, that model will be used instead of the USMC and USN CA forces. Likewise, because of their established doctrine and operational experience, only NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) model will be examined as an alternative model to the U.S. model. Once a CA force model is chosen, the paper will describe the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Personnel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF)

¹¹ Webster's Online Dictionary, "Africa," <http://www.websters-online-dictionary.com/definitions/africa?cx=partner-pub-0939450753529744%3Av0qd01-tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=africa&sa=Search#906>, (accessed October 6, 2011).

actions required by U.S. and Allied forces to create and sustain these CA capabilities in African militaries.¹²

U.S. Army CA forces by doctrine have five core functions; Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Population and Resource Control, Civil Military Information Management, Nation Assistance and Support to Civil Administration. Of these, the most relevant for African militaries would be Population and Resource Control, specifically Dislocated Civilian Operations, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, specifically Disaster Relief.¹³ N.A.T.O CIMIC forces by doctrine have three core functions; Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Civil Environment, and Support to the Force.¹⁴ The first two functions are most relevant to the development of African CA forces.

The structure of U.S. CA forces provides a doctrinal model focused on pushing functional expertise and generalist CA knowledge down to the lowest tactical level. Its forces are centered on a CA Company with a CMOC and five Civil Affairs Teams (CATs), which directly support a maneuver Brigade Combat Team and its subordinate maneuver elements. The structure of N.A.T.O CIMIC forces have a less prescriptive structure and instead have a broad spectrum of capabilities which can be woven together based on mission requirements.

Methodology

Five case study nations were chosen to validate the feasibility of this concept and determine its applicability to other nations in each region of Africa studied. The case study

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 1-0, The Army*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, June 2005), p 4-4.

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, September 2006) p 1-2.

¹⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *AJP-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC)*, (Brussels: NATO, June 2003), Chapter 104.

nations were selected based on their location within the previously referenced five geographically distinct areas of Africa; Northern Africa (Morocco), Western Africa (Ghana), Eastern Africa (Kenya), Central Africa (Cameroon), and Southern Africa (Botswana).

After assessing the potential benefits and costs of African militaries developing dedicated Civil Affairs or Civil-Military Cooperation units and determining the most appropriate forces model, the paper will then recommend the best way for the United States and other outside partners to support such development in a synchronized regional approach. Analysis will include the various international models for CA/CIMIC organizations, potential core functions and operational missions, and the DOTMLPF actions required to create and sustain such capabilities.

Limitations

This study recognizes that competing demands exist for an increasingly limited operating budget within the Department of Defense. However, given the current National Security and National Military Strategy documents along with recent comments by the incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey,¹⁵ this paper will assume that the United States military will continue to engage globally, specifically in Africa, in partnership activities to achieve greater security and stability. Secondly, this paper does not address partnership activities that currently attempt to teach African militaries how to use existing military forces to accomplish Civil Affairs functions. The paper is very clear that dedicated Civil Affairs or Civil Military Cooperation units, separate from other military branches, are essential to achieving the proposed security and stability. This paper does not address the potential long-term impacts of the recent “Arab Spring” demonstrations in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt. This movement

¹⁵ General Martin Dempsey, “Professional Development Address at National Defense University” (speech, Lincoln Hall, Fort McNair, DC, October 5, 2011).

toward more democratic and transparent political systems will most likely, substantively alter the operating environment in parts of Africa. However, these movements are far from complete and the outcomes will be incomplete prior to completion of this study. Finally, this paper assumes that trained African CA military forces provide a unique response capability which cannot be duplicated by internal or external civilian emergency response agencies or organizations. This assumption is based on the speed, resiliency and distinct functional capabilities of African military CA forces.

CHAPTER 1: Case Study Nations

Rationale of Case Studies

Borrowing from the economic analysis tool of Cost/Benefit Analysis (CBA), this paper will propose a modified version of the philosophical framework of CBA entitled Requirement/Capacity Analysis (RCA). Each case study nation will be classified as a compelling/marginal/unsuitable candidate for partner nation development of Civil Affairs forces. The proposition of this paper is that a recurring or future requirement in a nation or region and a capacity in the case study nation's military and society as a whole, equal a compelling argument for programming that nation's military Civil Affairs force development into the AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan. If a case study nation does not have a compelling requirement but has the capacity then there is an argument for Civil Affairs force development in the nation, which could be used cooperatively to conduct Civil Affairs activities with other neighboring African nations in their region. A negative recommendation could stem from either a complete lack of a requirement or capacity in the case study nation or region, or insurmountable factors, which would limit the capacity of the case study nation such as a military dictatorship or rampant corruption in the military. The result of RCA will produce an objective recommendation as to whether the requirements substantiate the expenditure necessary to develop Civil Affairs forces in the case study nation.

The Requirement portion of the equation will consist of two parts; the propensity and history of natural disasters or migratory crisis's inherent in the nation, and the unique civil military operational requirements of these events in relation to the identified Civil Affairs mission sets of Disaster Relief and Dislocated Civilian Operations. Africa is replete with natural disasters each year, however each nation and region has varying levels of impact from these

events. In some areas, the events are manageable with current host nation government agencies or NGOs resident in the nation. In other areas, despite a base level of capacity and a historical propensity for repeat disasters, the nation or region is continually overwhelmed by the disaster. As a result of, or in addition to these overwhelming disasters, the migratory nature of Africans compounds or complicates these crises. These are the nations or regions that are of relevance in this study.

The capacity portion of the equation is measured through three rationales: Military Stability, Cooperative Function, and Education. Military Stability is defined in this equation by three key components: civilian control of the military, the level of corruption in the nation and the military, and whether the nation's Armed forces have voluntary enlistment. It is the opinion of this paper that civilian control of the military creates a legitimate and stable environment for the conduct of Civil Affairs activities. Add to the civilian control a low level of corruption, and you exemplify a stable and legitimate Civil Affairs force that the population can trust to assist them in a time of great need during a natural disaster or migratory crises. The final piece of the military stability formula is examining the enlistment process for each case study nation's military. It is the opinion of this paper that the altruistic nature of enabling care for the affected population requires a volunteer Soldier. A conscripted Soldier will do his duty if compelled to, but a volunteer Soldier wants to be a Soldier and is motivated to serve his nation and its population.

The next element to be examined in each study is how cooperative a nation is in relation to its membership in the A.U., U.N. or regional economic partnerships. The proposition is that if a nation has demonstrated a propensity to get involved in A.U., U.N. or partnership activities that it will continue to demonstrate this propensity in the future. If a substantial investment is made in the development of Civil Affairs forces in a nation, it must be expected that this nation will not

only exercise this capability in its own borders, but will also contribute to regional or continental Civil Affairs partnership activities. The frequency and depth of international or regional cooperative activities by the case study nation's military determines Cooperative Function.

Lastly, the study will examine the educational milieu of the case study nation. Using the example of U.S. Army Civil Affairs forces, it is proposed that a higher than average intellect and education level is required for a Civil Affairs Soldier. Specifically the U.S. Army targets recruits with a high Skilled Technical (ST) score. The ST score is a sum of four sub tests of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test; General Science (GS), Mathematics Knowledge (MK), Mechanical Comprehension (MC), and Sum of Word Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension (VE). A minimum ST score for a Civil Affairs recruit is 110 and in comparison it is only a 100 for an Aircraft Traffic Control Operator (MOS 15Q).¹ In addition to a high level of Skilled Technical aptitude for Civil Affairs work, a U.S. Civil Affairs Soldier has at a minimum a high school diploma and in many cases is enrolled in, or has completed some university level education.

For purposes of this case study, the education rationale examines the literacy and education level of the case study nation measured by the literacy rate and School Life Expectancy of the population. The proposed correlation is to examine the case study education system and determine if the society produces a military volunteer that has a base level of education and literacy that would allow them to operate successfully in a challenging civil

¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, "How Your MOS is Determined," Installation Management Command, http://www.ima.army.mil/southwest/sites/aces/FAST_BSEP_FILES/HowYourMOS%20Is%20Determined.pdf (accessed November 21, 2011).

military environment. Figure 3 outlines this Requirements and Capacity Analysis in a mathematical formula for demonstration purposes.




Figure 3 Requirements Capacity Model

Northern Africa: Morocco

The RCA Recommendation for this region is that the nation of Morocco is a marginal candidate for development of Civil Affairs forces. It is a strong and reliable U.S. ally in the region and is a key partner in other armed force partner development activities. However, with such a limited scope of CA force development, the U.S. strategy must attempt to find the most suitable candidate despite security cooperation activities in other areas.

Requirements

Morocco has a small number of legitimate civil military requirements and they effectively utilize other IOs and NGOs to support and assist those affected by natural disasters. Morocco has strong capacity characteristics exemplified by their stable military and cooperative engagement with UN peacekeeping missions and U.S. security cooperation activities. Morocco does, however, have some limiting factors for development of functional Civil Affairs forces. First is the influence of corruption in the military and society as a whole. Second is the unresolved conflict in Western Sahara. Third is the control of the military by the monarchy vice the elected parliamentary executive. In balance this capacity potential is not sufficient to justify

CA force development in a country with small national requirements for civil military engagement.

In the last decade, Relief Web, an online natural disaster database sponsored by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), reports that Morocco has had nine natural disasters across a broad spectrum ranging from locusts and flooding to earthquakes and H1N1 pandemics. Several international and regional relief agencies have assisted Morocco in mitigating the impacts on its population from these disasters, which indicates that the Moroccan government might be unable or unwilling to utilize only Moroccan government agencies or the military to support Disaster Relief.

Morocco has natural disasters impacting their nation almost annually. However the scale is small and it impacts only a small portion of the population. As an example, the floods that occurred this year killed less than a 100 individuals and impacted about 15,000 families.² Not to minimize the tragedy suffered by those affected, but several Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) operating in Morocco handled mitigation of this crisis quickly and effectively. Morocco's risk profile is outlined in Table 1 and is a statistical representation of the likelihood of natural disasters impacting the population. In Morocco's case the population is at great risk to drought and moderate risk to earthquakes and floods.

² Relief Web, "RCA undertaking urgent relief operation in Morocco," <http://reliefweb.int/node/379634> (accessed November 2, 2011).

Table 1 Morocco Risk Profile³

Hazard type	Population exposed	Country ranking
Cyclone	16,290	39th out of 89
Drought	7,506,710	10th out of 184
Flood	23,478	66th out of 162
Landslide	874	70th out of 162
Earthquake	73,001	63rd out of 153
Tsunami	-	- out of 76

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports in 2011 Morocco has a Total Population of Concern (TPC)⁴ of 1,072 residing in Morocco and a TPC of 3,130 originating from Morocco.⁵ Traditionally, Morocco is a transit country for migratory Sub-Saharan Africans seeking economic opportunity in Europe. However as the 2011 U.N.H.C.R. statistics indicates, more individuals are seeking to remain in Morocco. The U.N.H.C.R. has an office in Morocco and works continuously to ensure the protection of refugees within mixed migration movements in Morocco. Again it is unclear whether the Moroccan government has the ability and the will to protect these migratory populations, and mitigate their impact on Moroccan citizens.

Capacity

On the capacity side of the RCA equation, there appears to be a deficit of key aspects of the capacity to develop Civil Affairs forces. First, King Mohammed VI and other government officials control the Moroccan military. Elected representatives have no operational or

³ PreventionWeb, "Morocco-Risk Profile," PreventionWeb 2011, <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/risk.php?cid=116> (accessed December 12, 2011).

⁴ A *Total Population of Concern* is defined by the UNHCR as the sum of the following categories; Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returned Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returned IDPs, Stateless Persons, and Various, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Figures at a Glance," <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c11.html> (accessed November 2, 2011).

⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Morocco," <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4860d6.html> (accessed November 2, 2011).

administrative control of the military.⁶ Second, Morocco as a nation is ranked 85th of 178 nations in the Transparency International Corruption Index. This means it has above average propensity for corruption and a lack of transparency in government activities. This does not always transfer to military forces, but with endemic nature of corruption in Moroccan society it is a valid assumption. Jane's, a defense security analysis group, reports that "a leaked 2008 cable from the Embassy in Rabat offers a less than laudatory view of the Moroccan military, saying it remains, 'plagued by corruption, an inefficient bureaucracy, low levels of education in the ranks, periodic threats of radicalization of some of its soldiers, political marginalization, and the deployment of most of its forces in the Western Sahara.'" ⁷ Thirdly, Morocco is not a member of AU and although it does participate in cooperative activities regionally and with the U.N. its participation is predicated on its role in the conflict over Western Sahara.

The conflict over the Western Sahara region is an important aspect of Moroccan foreign policy and a basis for judgment by other nations in their engagement with Morocco. The U.N. MINURSO mandate background describes the Western Sahara situation as follows:

Western Sahara is a Territory on the north-west coast of Africa bordered by Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, was administered by Spain until 1976. Both Morocco and Mauritania affirmed their claim to the territory, a claim opposed by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). The United Nations has been seeking a settlement in Western Sahara since the withdrawal of Spain in 1976 and the ensuing fighting between Morocco, which had "reintegrated" the Territory, and the Frente POLISARIO, supported by Algeria. (Mauritania renounced all claims to Western Sahara in 1979.)

⁶ International Business Publications, *Morocco: Country Study Guide*, (Washington DC: IBP, 2010), 98.

⁷ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, "Army (Morocco) Army," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-North Africa November 3, 2011, <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-North-Africa/Army-Morocco.html> (accessed December 11, 2011).

The MINURSO observer mission and U.N. mandate have effectively maintained a cease fire in the region since 1991 but little progress has been made on a permanent settlement. The two decade long entrenchment by both sides stagnate the region economically and subsequently the sparse population suffers. The African Union and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) involvement in trying to resolve the conflict alienated Morocco and they subsequently did not join the A.U. The strongly historical roots of Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara seem to prevent Morocco from resolving the conflict with the Frente POLISARIO and it currently stations the majority of its armed forces in the south at the U.N. separation zone in Western Sahara. As such, they have depicted those who support their claim as friends and those who do not, as enemies. The U.S. although supporting the U.N. mandate for peacekeeping, walks a delicate diplomatic line to advocate for Morocco to continue to engage in dialogue to resolve the conflict, but stops short of using its power to force Morocco to resolve its claim.

Despite the intransigency of Morocco's position on the Western Sahara conflict, several positive factors exist in the analysis of Moroccan capacity potential. Morocco is a cooperative nation. Many nations who take positions in opposition to geopolitical opinions isolate themselves from all but a few close allies. Morocco appears to choose a different path as they offer to contribute troops to other U.N. peacekeeping missions. As of October 2011, Morocco is contributing 1,579 troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations.⁸ Morocco typically contributes troops to U.N. missions as opposed to subject experts or police. These contributions are an indicator of Morocco's confidence in its military capability.

⁸ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations: Monthly Summary of Contributions," http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/oct11_1.pdf (accessed November 2, 2011).

Morocco has an all-volunteer military.⁹ Recruiting and maintaining an all-volunteer military force requires a concerted effort by a government and transforming those new recruits into an effective fighting force indicates a strong institutional military structure, which is very beneficial to the types of transformation required by CA force development. Morocco draws its recruits from a homogeneous population, which is moderately educated. In terms of religion, Morocco is 99% Sunni Islam and ethnically is 99% Arab Berber. Although one would typically seek diversity in its military force, it is more important that it represents the population it serves. In Morocco's case its Islamic roots and Berber ethnicity could create trusted relationships among its armed forces and the populations in its region of North Africa.

Morocco has an average literacy rate of 63% for males and 52% overall. Still indicative of the lack of balance in their education system, males and females have equal access to education.¹⁰ This fact is also displayed in its School Life Expectancy (SLE)¹¹ which is 11 years

⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Military Service Age and Obligation The World Factbook" Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html> (accessed November 2, 2011).

¹⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, "Literacy, The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html#mo> (accessed November 2, 2011).

¹¹ "School life expectancy (SLE) is the total number of years of schooling (primary to tertiary) that a child can expect to receive, assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future age is equal to the current enrollment ratio at that age. Caution must be maintained when utilizing this indicator in international comparisons. For example, a year or grade completed in one country is not necessarily the same in terms of educational content or quality as a year or grade completed in another country. SLE represents the expected number of years of schooling that will be completed, including years spent repeating one or more grades." Central Intelligence Agency, "References: Definitions and Notes, The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2205> (accessed November 2, 2011).

for males and 10 years for females.¹² Overall, Morocco has an average level of education for its population in comparison to others nations in Northern Africa.

Western Africa: Ghana

The RCA Recommendation for this region is that the nation of Ghana is a compelling candidate for development of Civil Affairs forces. Ghana has many positive attributes, which validate this recommendation. They have a cooperative, educated, volunteer military with proven interoperability characteristics, and they have cooperative relationships within the West African region and throughout Africa with the A.U. and the U.N. The challenges to Civil Affairs force development in Ghana are suspect civilian control of the military, and identified corruption within the government and military. These challenges must be considered during planning for the potential development of Ghana Civil Affairs forces.

Requirements

Ghana experiences almost routine flooding within its borders, with seven catastrophic events in the last decade.¹³ The most recent floods this year killed 70 people and displaced an estimated 280,000.¹⁴ The geography of this small, yet densely populated West African nation is characterized by large tracks of dense coastal rain forest and a large manmade lake dominating half of the country. Lake Volta, the largest reservoir by surface area in the world, was created in 1966 by damming the river Volta to; store water for generation of hydro- electric power, improve inland water transport, boost fishing, and ensure enough water for domestic and industrial use,

¹² Central Intelligence Agency, "Morocco, The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html> (accessed November 2, 2011).

¹³ Relief Web, "Ghana country page," <http://reliefweb.int/taxonomy/term/162> (accessed November 14, 2011).

¹⁴ Relief Web, "Ghana: Floods-July 2, 2011," <http://reliefweb.int/taxonomy/term/8878> (accessed November 14, 2011).

and for irrigation.¹⁵ Although this lake has provided some of these benefits, it can be argued that its benefits are not sufficient in relation to the human cost from the flooding associated with this man-made lake.

In reaction to the need for a government response capacity in the wake of domestic disasters, the Ghana government established the National Disaster Management Organization (N.A.D.M.O.). Similar to the U.S. model for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), N.A.D.M.O. coordinates the activities of Ghana government and local agencies in response to natural disasters. The response required by the routine flooding makes this organization successful at managing government efforts to mitigate the impacts on the Ghana population. However, two challenges exist in this framework; first is overall capacity, and second is the interface between N.A.D.M.O and the Ghana military.

The scope of the impact from these flooding events is extensive. Despite an effort to conduct mitigation prior to the event, by relocating people out of the danger zones, a disproportionate number of people are affected. Each year, when flooding occurs in Ghana, on average over 200,000 people are affected.¹⁶ N.A.D.M.O is a small government agency in a small Ghana central government. It is quickly overwhelmed and must rely on international aid organizations, NGOs or the Ghana military to provide extra or unique capacity.

Conflicting priorities, organizational structure, and separate authorities make this interagency and civilian integration challenging. As we see in other nations to include the U.S.,

¹⁵ International Lake Environment Committee, "Volta Lake," <http://www.ilec.or.jp/database/afr/afr-16.html> (accessed on November 14, 2011).

¹⁶ Integrated Regional Information Networks, "GHANA: 'Nearly 275,000' affected by floods in little-known disaster," UNOCHA, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=74278> (accessed November 14, 2011).

Civil Affairs forces can work in this gray area to reduce the problems of integration to “include conducting technical assessments, transportation of goods and supplies, security for humanitarian infrastructure, and when deemed appropriate by civilian officials, direct efforts to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters.”¹⁷

The primary result of the previously discussed flooding is death and injury, but there are more long-term impacts from population displacement. In many cases, the populations choosing to live in dangerous low-lying areas lose all of their personal belongings when floodwaters overtake their homes. After tending to the immediate lifesaving needs of the population, the requirements for shelter and long term relocation dramatically increase the demand on the response agencies. In most cases, Ghana civilian government or NGOs best handle these long-term care needs. However, this environment quite often is characterized by tense, potentially volatile situations in which the affected populations create, or are subject to security problems. Gangs and criminals take advantage of this lack of security to establish their power and exploit the affected population, requiring national military forces to augment local police in response. During this process of establishing and maintaining security, relief activities still need to continue and many civilian agencies, unlike Civil Affairs forces, are unwilling or unable to operate in this environment. Lastly, Ghana’s risk profile is outlined in Table 2 and is a statistical representation of the likelihood of natural disasters impacting the population. In Ghana’s case the population is at moderate risk to drought and floods.

¹⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 3-05.40, Department of the Army, Washington DC: September 2006, Chapter 3-30.

Table 2 Ghana Risk Profile¹⁸

Hazard type	Population exposed	Country ranking
Cyclone	-	- out of 89
Drought	2,844,810	25th out of 184
Flood	23,427	67th out of 162
Landslide	42	125th out of 162
Earthquake	-	- out of 153
Tsunami	-	- out of 76

Within West Africa, there is also a recent historical basis for intraregional migration. The French joint administrative unit of Afrique Occidentale Francaise (A.O.F.) ruled over the sub region from 1895 till 1958 and facilitated economic migration and integration.¹⁹ The A.O.F. was attempting to capitalize on longer historical trends of ethnic community and economic migration that existed in West Africa for centuries prior to the Europeans arriving. Once independent nations were established, this A.O.F. sponsored mobility ended this trend, forcing migrants to move in their traditional patterns in a sub-legal manner without regard for borders.

Ghana also experiences migratory emergencies from outside its borders. The conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria and Ivory Coast all created political refugees. In 2011, the political and electoral crisis in the Ivory Coast sent over 18,000 refugees across the border into neighboring Ghana.²⁰ The government of Ghana is working extensively with the U.N.H.C.R. to repatriate these refugees and provide temporary shelter and care. The challenge is caring and managing the initial onslaught of refugees then transitioning activities to civilian authorities, which is by U.S. doctrine a Civil Affairs forces core function.

¹⁸ PreventionWeb, "Ghana-Risk Profile," PreventionWeb 2011, <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/risk.php?cid=67> (accessed December 12, 2011).

¹⁹ Olsen, Anne Sofie Westh, "Reconsidering West African Migration Changing focus from European immigration to intra-regional flows," DIIS paper 2011:21.

²⁰ Relief Web, "Ivory Coast Refugees Question Security of Returning Home," <http://reliefweb.int/node/447842> (accessed November 14, 2011).

There is an established requirement for Civil Military activities in Ghana and throughout the region of West Africa, which can be facilitated by having African Civil Affairs forces. The unfortunate reality is that traditional migratory patterns, natural disasters, political crisis's and armed conflict make West Africa, with Ghana at its center, a ripe area for the conduct of Civil Affairs activities. To date, the U.S. has invested time and resources to conduct U.S. military theater security cooperation activities in the area. This effort has seen results of enhanced military-to-military cooperation with Ghana and a positive view of U.S. intentions in the region. However, as the U.S. looks to expand partner capacity and reduce its military expenditures it is imperative to develop a Civil Affairs capability within the Ghana military.

Capacity

The author has highlighted the established Civil Military activity requirement, now the paper will now examine Ghana's capacity to develop Civil Affairs forces. The civil-military relationship in Ghana in the period following independence was strained and dominated by the military. Within the past decade, civilian oversight of the security sector is increasing, but is still neither codified nor accepted as a fact by members of the Ghana military. Much of the U.S. military assistance provided over this time period is predicated on continual reforms and the momentum is certainly towards functional and acceptable civilian control of the military.

Ghana's military consists of volunteers between the ages of 18-26 with a basic education certificate, which is the equivalent of a ninth grade education in the U.S., and there is no conscription.²¹ Additionally, Ghana has an overall literacy rate of 66% and a School Life

²¹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Military Service Age and Obligation The World Factbook" Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html> (accessed November 2, 2011).

Expectancy of 11 years for males.²² These requirements are a positive factor in a stable military force and create the potential to expand the military force with Civil Affairs Soldiers.

U.S. Civil Affairs Soldiers provide an excellent example of the powerful effect of a voluntary, well-educated Soldier. It is the opinion of the author in working with U.S. Civil Affairs Soldiers over the past 15 years that the characteristics of education and volunteerism, in Civil Affairs as well as the military, create a unique synergy perfectly suited for the challenging civil-military operating environment.

Transparency International ranks Ghana number 62 on its Corruption index and it has the lowest corruption score of any West Africa nation.²³ However, evidence of a norm of corruption stills exists as was outlined in the U.S. State Department 2010 Human Rights Report. The report indicated that corruption existed at all levels of government in Ghana, although much progress has been made and reforms continue.²⁴

The last element of capacity is the cooperative function of the Ghana military. A strong U.S. ally in Africa, many U.S./Ghana military exercises are conducted each year and one in particular highlighted U.S. Civil Affairs forces working with N.A.D.M.O.²⁵ Ghana is also a well-respected member of the African Union and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). Providing forces to the standby force for West Africa, one of the five contingency

²² Central Intelligence Agency, "Literacy, The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html#mo> (accessed November 2, 2011).

²³ Transparency International, "Corruption Index," Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed on November 14, 2011).

²⁴ U.S. Department of State, "Human Rights Report: Ghana," U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154349.htm> (accessed on November 14, 2011).

²⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, "U.S., Ghana partner to teach malaria prevention," Headquarters, Department of the Army, <http://www.army.mil/article/62006/> (accessed November 14, 2011).

brigades established by the African Union. In addition, Ghana provided "3,399 troops and 62 experts on mission to U.N. peacekeeping missions; the third largest African peacekeeping contributor nation to multinational peacekeeping operations and the seventh-largest among all peacekeeping contributing nations."²⁶

Eastern Africa: Kenya

Kenya is a compelling candidate for development of Civil Affairs forces. It has routine natural disasters and extensive conflict on its borders, which create migratory crises. Beyond the immediate need within its border, there are a large number of these disaster incidents in the East African sub region. Kenya has a well-educated society with a strong and stable civil military establishment and is already an influential political, economic and military leader in East Africa. Finally, it has established military cooperation relationship with the U.S. and the U.K. and conducts regular military training and exercise events with these nations. Simply altering or modifying this construct could pay great dividends in the region for AFRICOM as a Kenyan Civil Affairs force could conduct Civil Affairs activities in its own nation as well as the region. This force would be an example for further security cooperation with other nations in the region and the continent as a whole. However, despite all of this compelling data it is necessary to understand that Kenya is a very corrupt nation, and this corrupt influence likely affects the conduct of Kenya's military. This corruption could unravel any well-trained Kenyan CA force as was the case in the lessons observed about U.S. CA forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

²⁶ Jane's Defence and Intelligence Analysis, "Ghana: Armed Forces," Jane's, http://client.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/wafrsu/ghans100.htm@current&pageSelected=janesReference&keyword=Ghana%20Armed%20Forces&backPath=http://client.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=WAFR& (accessed on November 14, 2011).

For example, a U.S.M.C. Reserve Civil Affairs Officer working for the 5th Civil Affairs Group in Iraq in 2005-6 was convicted in U.S. federal court of stealing \$32,000 in cash from Iraqi reconstruction funds while working in Iraq.²⁷ Next, we have an U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer who was convicted of stealing \$700,000 from Iraqi reconstruction funds.²⁸ There are numerous examples from the recent conflict in Iraq of CA Officers or Soldiers who were caught stealing money from reconstruction funds that were pouring into Iraq during the U.S. occupation. The incidents that were identified are probably only a small portion of the actual corrupt actions that took place during the eight years U.S. forces were in Iraq and the ten years the U.S. has spent in Afghanistan. These incidents tarnish the phenomenal work done by thousands of CA personnel who have operated in these environments and damage the Iraqi population perception of not just the CA forces, but also the U.S. military and military forces in general. This scenario cannot occur in the recommended African CA force development strategy or it will not succeed.

Requirements

Floods strike Kenya annually and in some cases occur multiple times in a year. As an example, the population impact of the floods in 2010 was over 23,000 individuals.²⁹ In October 2011 a flood in the eastern part of the country displaced 30,000. Most of these floods cause population displacement and in Kenya's case also affect refugee camps located in this country. Kenya's risk profile is outlined in Table 3 and is a statistical representation of the likelihood of

²⁷ Militarycorruption.com, "Marine Major Pleads Guilty to Stealing Iraq Reconstruction Funds, militarycorruption.com 2010, <http://www.militarycorruption.com/ericschmidt2.htm> (accessed December 11, 2011).

²⁸ Militarycorruption.com, "Army Captain Caught Stealing \$700K from Humanitarian and Relief Funds Earmarked for Iraq and Afghanistan," militarycorruption.com 2010, <http://www.militarycorruption.com/nguyen.htm> (accessed December 11, 2011).

²⁹ UNOCHA, "Kenya: Floods Situation Report No. 2, 05 Jan 2010," Relief Web, <http://reliefweb.int/node/339300> (accessed November 18, 2011).

natural disasters impacting the population. In Kenya's case the population is at great risk to drought and moderate risk to floods and landslides.

Table 3 Kenya Risk Profile³⁰

Hazard type	Population exposed	Country ranking
Cyclone	-	- out of 89
Drought	8,958,760	6th out of 184
Flood	31,468	51st out of 162
Landslide	9,556	21st out of 162
Earthquake	3,003	113th out of 153
Tsunami	4,698	50th out of 76

Kenya currently has a refugee Total Population of Concern (TPC) of 751,196 residing in large U.N.H.C.R. sponsored refugee camps in Dadaab, Hagadera, and Dagahaley near the Somalia border.³¹ Kenya also has an estimated 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).³² These two large population groups are almost entirely dependent on U.N.H.C.R., other IOs NGOs, and the Kenyan government for daily subsistence and shelter. While Kenyans in other flood affected areas may have a certain degree of independent self-support through familial or tribal networks, the refugee and IDP populations require immediate and significant support.

Migration into and around Kenya poses an enormous administrative challenge to the Kenyan government and shortages of the capabilities to manage these migratory crises enhance instability within Kenya. One could speculate that the IDP movement within Kenya is in part related to the instability of the Kenyan government to mitigate the effects of the large refugee population. Table 4 demonstrates the scope of this problem to the Kenyan government and the

³⁰ PreventionWeb, "Kenya-Risk Profile," PreventionWeb 2011, <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/risk.php?iso=ken> (accessed December 12, 2011).

³¹ UNHCR, "2011 UNHCR country operations profile – Kenya," UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483a16&submit=GO> (accessed on November 18, 2011).

³² *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)* by definition are: Any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (JP 1-02)

large support they receive from the U.N. With seemingly endless conflict in Somalia, the stream of refugees into Kenya will, in all probability, continue for the near and midterm future creating a strong requirement in the RCA model for Kenya.

Table 4: Migratory Challenges in Kenya³³

2011 UNHCR planning figures for Kenya					
TYPE OF POPULATION	ORIGIN	JAN 2011		DEC 2011	
		TOTAL IN COUNTRY	OF WHOM ASSISTED BY UNHCR	TOTAL IN COUNTRY	OF WHOM ASSISTED BY UNHCR
Total		970,300	585,000	1,048,400	684,800
Refugees	Somalia	385,000	385,000	516,000	516,000
	Sudan	25,000	25,000	32,500	32,500
	Ethiopia	35,500	35,500	43,000	43,000
	Various	20,000	20,000	28,000	28,000
	Ethiopia	14,000	14,000	12,000	12,000
Asylum-seekers	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	2,500	2,500	2,300	2,300
	Sudan	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
	Various	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
IDPs	Kenya	305,300	0	313,800	50,000
Returnees (IDPs)	Kenya	80,000	80,000	0	0
Stateless	Stateless	100,000	0	100,000	0

Capacity

Kenya has never been ruled by the military and the military notably demonstrates their reluctance to intervene in Kenyan politics. The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is the President, Mwai Kibaki.³⁴ The historical influence of British Colonial efforts to establish and maintain a Kenyan military and the civilian oversight mentioned above create a stable military environment and relationship to the Kenyan population. This foundation is an indicator of a potential for successful Civil Affairs force development.

³³ UNHCR, "2011 UNHCR country operations profile – Kenya," UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483a16&submit=GO> (accessed on November 18, 2011).

³⁴ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: , "Kenya: Armed Forces," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Central Africa, http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cafrsu/kenys100.htm@current&pageSelected=janesReference&keyword=kenyaarmedforces&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=CAFRS&toclink-i0011110013786 (accessed November 18, 2011).

Corruption is to a large degree part of the society of most African nations, but the real question is to what level is this prevalent in the society and specifically the military. Examining the Transparency International analysis for Kenya some interesting notes can be made. First, Kenya has the worst rating of any of the five case study nations in this paper. Their ranking is 154 of 176 nations studied, and indicates a very corrupt society in Kenya. Transparency International describes it as “one of the greatest challenges facing Kenya that undermines its fledgling democracy, human rights, economic well-being, growth and development, and national stability.”³⁵ Secondly, although there is strong evidence of extensive corruption throughout the political and economic arena, there is very little evidence that it exists to such a large degree in the Armed Forces. The logical link however, is that if one is born and grows up in a society filled with corruption that those societal norms will still exist in members of the Armed Forces.

The last component of the military stability element is the service requirement and education of the Kenyan military members. Kenya’s Armed Forces are a volunteer force consisting of enlistees between the ages of 18-26 who incur a nine-year obligation upon enlistment.³⁶ Military applicants must show a school-leaving certificate from secondary education, which is the U.S. equivalent of a high school degree. The literacy rate in Kenya is a very high 90.6% for the overall population. The combination of attaining a high school degree and such a high literacy rate produces an excellent candidate for a Kenyan Civil Affairs Soldier.

³⁵ Transparency International, “Kenya,” Corruption Perceptions Index Report 2010, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed on November 18, 2011).

³⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, “Military Service Age and Obligation The World Factbook” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html> (accessed November 2, 2011).

From a cooperation perspective, Kenya is a large part of the bedrock of the East African military establishment. As an example, “the Kenya Rapid Deployment Capacity (KRDC) facility was officially opened at Embakasi garrison, Nairobi in February 2009. A co-sponsored initiative between Kenya and U.K., the KRDC is designed to provide a high readiness unit to respond speedily to emergencies in the East African region. It will form part of the African Standby Force and would deploy under an A.U. mandate.”³⁷ The Kenyan military also is currently contributing over 800 troops to U.N. missions and are conducting interventions into Somalia to stem the tide of violence propagated by the Al Shabbah terrorist group infecting Somalia. There is strong evidence in this analysis of the will and the relevant capability of the Kenyan Armed Forces to cooperate in security framework within the region of East Africa.

Central Africa: Cameroon

The RCA Recommendation for this region is that the nation of Cameroon is a compelling candidate for development of Civil Affairs forces. Cameroon has an identified enduring requirement for Civil Affairs activities in the functional area of Disaster Relief and Dislocated Civilian Operations. In terms of capacity, Cameroon has a stable civil military governmental structure with a cooperative partnership approach and a sufficiently educated volunteer military force. Negative factors that must be considered as concerns are the apparent rampant corruption within the government and a disparate, and at times secessionist, Anglophone population.

³⁷ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: , “Kenya: Armed Forces,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Central Africa, http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cafrsu/kenys100.htm@current&pageSelected=janesReference&keyword=kenyaarmedforces&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=CAFRS&#toclink-j0011110013786 (accessed November 18, 2011).

Requirement

Flooding in this central African nation occurs annually, but the impact varies with some years being more severe than others. In 2007 for example, more profound flooding left over 10,000 people homeless.³⁸ A constant and more deadly secondary threat to the initial flooding is disease. Quite often in the wake of this flooding there is a shortage of sanitary water supplies. In both 2010 and 2011, extensive Cholera and dysentery outbreaks affected over 85,000 individuals.³⁹ Cholera and dysentery are treatable and preventable diseases, but in nations with little capacity to handle routine medical problems, epidemics of this scale are a national emergency requiring mobilization of not only the nation's resources, but those of the IO and NGO community. Cameroon's risk profile is outlined in Table 5 and is a statistical representation of the likelihood of natural disasters impacting the population. In Cameroon's case the population is at great risk to drought and moderate risk to floods and landslides.

Table 5 Cameroon Risk Profile⁴⁰

Hazard type	Population exposed	Country ranking
Cyclone	-	- out of 89
Drought	413,988	76th out of 184
Flood	44,023	44th out of 162
Landslide	6,668	28th out of 162
Earthquake	194	142nd out of 153
Tsunami	-	- out of 76

Next, in the area of migration Cameroon currently has a Total Population of Concern of 106,658 inbound refugees and 17,065 outbound refugees.⁴¹ Most of these inbound refugees

³⁸ Disaster Relief Emergency Fund, "Floods DREF Operation No. MDRCM005 Final Report," Relief Web, <http://reliefweb.int/node/264867> (accessed on November 19 2011).

³⁹ The Guardian, "Cholera sweeps across western and central Africa," Relief Web, <http://reliefweb.int/node/455216> (accessed November 19, 2011).

⁴⁰ PreventionWeb, "Cameron-Risk Profile," PreventionWeb 2011, <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/risk.php?cid=30> (accessed December 12, 2011).

come from the Central African Republic and Great Lakes region seeking more holistic security in the physical, economic, political, and food realms. The large number of refugees in the eastern half of Cameroon required the deployment of the Armed forces to maintain a secure environment for its own population, the refugees and all the IOs and NGOs who volunteer to come and provide aid. Although U.N.H.C.R. tracks no IDPs in Cameroon, as was mentioned previously, most flood victims lose their homes in the floods but tend to stay in their area and not relocate. Another interesting aspect of the disease outbreak is that it has occurred in the western and southern sections of the nation, which are away from the refugee crisis area. One could say, at times that the whole of Cameroon requires some level of civil support.

Capacity

Cameroon executes civilian control over the Armed Forces. The elected president, Paul Biya executes authority over the 14,000 man military through the Minister of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. He controls the 9,000 men Gendarme directly in domestic security activities.⁴² Internal security in this large nation is often a concern and this Gendarme has a reputation for heavy-handed tactics in quelling dissent. The national parliament has no voice in the security sector and there is an underlying concern in this analysis of embedding too much security sector power in the office of the President.

The Transparency Index classifies Cameroon as a corrupt nation with a rank of 154 of 176 nations studied. This corruption manifests itself in typical sub-Saharan fashion throughout

⁴¹ UNHCR, "2011 UNHCR country operations profile – Cameroon," UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=4a03e1926&submit=GO> (accessed November 19, 2011).

⁴² Jane's, "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Africa," Jane's, http://search.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cafrsu/comes100.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=cameroon%20armed%20forces&backPath=http://search.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Search&Prod_Name=CAFRS& (accessed November 19, 2011).

the political and economic arenas. This is an improvement over the past decade when, 1999 and 2000, Transparency International ranked Cameroon as the most corrupt nation in the world. As a result of the stigma of this designation Cameroon has incorporated the fight against corruption into its political agenda. However, despite overt government implementation of anti-corruption measures, it is in the public sector that corruption remains widespread. Within the police and the Gendarmerie, corruption remains rampant, and although the military is part of this security sector instances of corruption in the military are less prevalent.

It is widely understood by those in Cameroon society that should you wish to have a public organization conduct a service for you, there will be a gift expected to ensure completion. There is an ethnic and cultural dimension to the perception and execution of corruption as two main groups center around the area of Colonial French influence and on the area with an English Colonial background. The Francophone identified group currently hold political majority power and the Anglophones represent a strong opposition. In addition to these larger cultural groupings, Cameroon has a heterogeneous population with over 250 identifiable ethnic groups and religious affiliations split evenly between Christianity, Islam and indigenous African religions.⁴³

All enlistees in the Cameroon Armed Forces are male and female volunteers age 18-23 who are required to have a high school education and incur an initial four-year obligation.⁴⁴ The military will periodically call for additional temporary volunteers in the midst of national crisis like existed during the conflict with Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula. Overall, Jane's assesses

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Cameroon," U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26431.htm> (accessed on November 19, 2011).

⁴⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, "Military Service Age and Obligation The World Factbook" Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html> (accessed November 2, 2011).

the military in this way “by regional standards, Cameroon has a medium-sized military that is regarded as above average in terms of funding and professionalism.”⁴⁵

Currently Cameroon only contributes 111 troops to U.N. missions and most of those are members of their experienced Gendarme force.⁴⁶ However, despite a great deal of tension still existing between Nigeria and Cameroon over the disputed Bakassi peninsula, Cameroon is proactively attempting to become a stronger member of U.N./A.U. peacekeeping operations. Joining the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (A.C.O.T.A.) partnership in 2007 and overt training programs with French and U.S. military show credible evidence of Cameroon’s intent to continue to professionalize its military. By example, in July 2011 a U.S. Maritime Civil Affairs Support Team (M.C.A.S.T.) conducted a training exercise with Cameroon Rapid Intervention Battalion.⁴⁷

From an education perspective, the Cameroon Armed Forces show indications of good potential for development of Civil Affairs forces. The minimum high school education requirement for all enlistees is a good educational base, making them above average in relation to an overall Cameroon population, which has a literacy rate of 76% and a School Life

⁴⁵ Jane’s, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Africa,” Jane’s, http://search.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cafrsu/cames100.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=cameroon%20armed%20forces&backPath=http://search.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Search&Prod_Name=CAFRS& (accessed November 19, 2011).

⁴⁶ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations: Monthly Summary of Contributions,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/sept11_1.pdf (accessed November 2, 2011).

⁴⁷ Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Command, “MCAST Team Conducts Security Training with Cameroon Sailors,” Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, <http://www.dvidshub.net/news/54064/mcast-team-conducts-security-training-with-cameroon-sailors#.TsgYFfGtvzU> (accessd November 19, 2011).

Expectancy of 11 years.⁴⁸ These educated young military members could also begin to exhibit some of anti-corruption attributes being introduced in Cameroon society through its education system.

Southern Africa: Botswana

The RCA recommendation for Botswana is that it is a compelling candidate for development of Civil Affairs Forces. It does not have an immediate requirement in its nation for Civil Affairs forces as Botswana has few natural disasters or migratory crises. However, unlike the other case study nations with such an immediate requirement, the author advocates a proactive regional approach with Botswana. Reinforcing success is a rare opportunity within the AFRICOM AOR and should be pursued in Botswana. Utilizing the strong foundation of a stable, cooperative, and well-educated military, AFRICOM could create a Botswana Civil Affairs force which could have a regional impact by mitigating the potentiality of a mass exodus from Zimbabwe, and providing CA forces throughout Africa to assist in A.U. and U.N. missions. Civil Affairs is a niche capability that very few nations could create as effectively as is apparent in Botswana and would go along way to promoting the stability and prestige of the Botswana nation.

Requirements

As indicated in the other case studies, flooding is the primary natural disaster to strike Botswana. However, there is a sharp difference in frequency and scope of these events. As a frame of reference, over the past decade only two major flooding events occurred in Botswana

⁴⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, "Literacy, The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html#mo> (accessed November 2, 2011).

and the affected population was estimated around 3,000 individuals in each case.⁴⁹ Overall, the requirement for a Civil Affairs force available to respond to natural disasters in Botswana is small, but such a force could be used in conjunction with a regional A.U. response to a disaster emergency. Botswana's risk profile is outlined in Table 6 and is a statistical representation of the likelihood of natural disasters impacting the population. In Botswana's case the population is at moderate risk to drought, floods and landslides.

Table 6 Botswana Risk Profile⁵⁰

Hazard type	Population exposed	Country ranking
Cyclone	-	- out of 89
Drought	177,422	104th out of 184
Flood	2,904	124th out of 162
Landslide	-	- out of 162
Earthquake	-	- out of 153

Migratory crises have a larger potential concern for Botswana. Its neighbor Zimbabwe's repressive dictatorship and isolated economy forces many Zimbabwean people to migrate to prevent political oppression or for economic opportunity. A common migratory pattern is toward Southern Africa, which could mean transiting through Botswana. Currently the U.N.H.C.R. reports that Botswana has 3,235 refugees, a relatively small number compared to the almost 200,000 in South Africa.⁵¹ The requirement for a current need to manage migratory crises does not exist, but the potential explosion or implosion in Zimbabwe remains a constant

⁴⁹ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, "Botswana: Floods DREF Operation No. MDRBW001 Update No. 1," ReliefWeb, <http://reliefweb.int/node/325364> (accessed on November 20, 2011).

⁵⁰ PreventionWeb, "Botswana-Risk Profile," PreventionWeb 2011, <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/risk.php?cid=23> (accessed December 12, 2011).

⁵¹ UNHCR, "2011 Regional Operations Profile - Southern Africa," UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e485456&submit=GO> (accessed November 20, 2011).

threat as long as Robert Mugabe stays in power. Should this catastrophic event occur in Zimbabwe, the likely impact on Botswana and the region will be large, making the development of a Botswanan Civil Affairs force a compelling proactive measure.

Capacity

The Armed Forces of Botswana operate in a stable civil military environment with President Ian Seretse Khama executing civilian control of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF). The B.D.F. is a small force within Southern Africa, but has taken great pride in trying to create a professional and effective force. Jane's characterizes the B.D.F. as "a capable and well-disciplined military force," and "the B.D.F. is considered an apolitical and professional institution."⁵²

Corruption is not an issue in Botswana. Botswana is ranked 33 on TI's corruption index, which is the highest rank of any African nation and comparable to many developed nations in the Western world.⁵³ This is not to indicate that there is no disruptive deviant behavior in Botswana, as it also has a huge poaching problem requiring regular military action to control. In 2010, Botswana even had to reclude itself from sending peacekeepers to support the AU mission in Somalia because of the large increase in poaching activity.⁵⁴ According to Botswana Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Phandu Skelemani, "Poachers are killing our wildlife which is our revenue

⁵² Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, "Botswana: Armed Forces, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Southern Africa, http://client.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/safrsu/botss100.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=botswana%20armed%20forces&backPath=http://client.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Search/Prod_Name=SAFRS& (accessed on November 20, 2011).

⁵³ Transparency International, "Botswana," Corruption Perceptions Index Report 2010, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed on November 18, 2011).

⁵⁴ Bush Warriors, "Poaching Prevents Botswana From Sending Troops to Aid in Somalia!" Bush Warriors: A Global Voice for Wildlife, <http://bushwarriors.wordpress.com/2010/08/05/breaking-news-poaching-prevents-botswana-from-sending-troops-to-aid-in-somalia/> (accessed November 20, 2011).

(earner), therefore members of the Botswana Defence Force have been deployed in anti-poaching units as well as fighting Foot and Mouth Disease with other national duties they are now engaged in.”⁵⁵

Looking at the other elements of capacity, Botswana scores high marks. In the cooperative metric, although it currently has no contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions, it has in the past contributed forces to U.N. and A.U. missions. According to Jane’s “Botswana has deployed personnel with U.N.M.I.S. in Sudan and U.N.A.M.I.D. in Darfur but while the BDF is well-equipped and well-trained, its participation in such operations is currently limited by financial constraints.”⁵⁶ Botswana is also a participating member in the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), one of five regional brigades being established by the African Union as an African Standby Force (A.S.F.).

In addition to good marks for cooperation, Botswana has an all-volunteer, well-educated military force. The society from which enlistees come from has a literacy rate of 82% and a School Life Expectancy of 12 years. Due to the nature of the constant fight poachers, there is also a strong nationalistic and possibly altruistic motive among military members as they fight and die to protect the wildlife in their country. This wildlife is a major source of the tourism dollars that currently contribute approximately 12% of its GDP. The Botswana government outlines Tourism as a major source of its future GDP growth as its mining sector decreases in value in the coming decades.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Ibid, p 1.

⁵⁶ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southern Africa, p 1.

⁵⁷ Republic of Botswana Ministry of Commerce and Industry Department of Tourism, “BOTSWANA TOURISM MASTER PLAN,” May 2008, <http://www.ub.bw/itrc/> (accessed November 20, 2011).

Viability of RCA Model

The Requirements Capacity Analysis model is a viable model when utilized as a rationale for examining AFRICOM case study nations. The results of the case studies indicated that four of the five nations were compelling candidates for development of Civil Affairs forces and one nation is a marginal candidate. The positive attribute of the model is a more objective measure of the requirement for Civil Affairs forces in relation to a subjective potential to develop Civil Affairs forces within the studied nation. The limiting factor in this dialectic is whether another civilian organization such as the National Disaster Management Organization (N.A.D.M.O.) in Ghana or an external organization like the Red Crescent Society could be enhanced to provide the required capacity in lieu of development of case study national Civil Affairs forces.

This paper will argue that although there is enormous capacity in the IO and NGO community to respond to the natural disaster and migratory crises in AFRICOM, it is strategically more relevant for African nations to reduce the current overwhelming dependence on external actors. Since the development of independent African nations in the last century, these new nation states have relied on their past colonial masters or other external actors such as the U.N., U.S. and China to provide expertise, funding and support to execute governance. There is little dispute that most of this support was critical to ensuring the survival of these new nations. However, it created an independence/dependence dialectic which still inhibits the long-term development of Africa.

This dialectic is expressed by a strong belief that independence from their colonial masters was a reinforcement of the African belief that they were worthy of independence and their colonial enslavement was unjustifiable and inhibited Africans from becoming developed nations. The other side of the dialectic concerns the harsh reality that these African nations were

ill equipped to operate in the Westphalian nation state model or a global economy. There was little institutional knowledge or structures to provide a foundation for their development. In addition to this lack of knowledge, there was a very low level of Human Development, which created a lack of human capacity for exercising governance and economic development. This inability to operate as independent nations and demonstrate the ability to coexist in a stable and global political and economic environment is the focus of the U.S. defense and development strategy in Africa.

It is the imperative of AFRICOM and U.S. government agency policy to support the development of self-sufficient capabilities within African nations. Coping with and mitigating the effects of the natural disasters and migratory crises preclude the long-term use of external actors. These IOs and NGOs must be used only to cover a gap in capabilities until that gap can be bridged by AFRICOM and its supporting partners development of African CA forces. If this mitigation and response capability must be internal to each African nation, it would require a level of investment that is just not feasible in the current global environment. An alternative would be target regional capabilities in lieu of the ability to improve every nation. If one or two compelling candidates could be identified in each region to provide this capability to the entire region, it could be an excellent intermediate objective towards each nation having this similar capability.

With a clear target in each region, the Civil Affairs force development strategy must address the counter argument to developing domestic response civilian agencies instead of Civil Affairs forces. Most of the long-term effort in disaster response comes as a result of civilian agencies; there is no argument in this respect. However, this paper argues that civilian agencies fall short in several key areas in relation to a corresponding military Civil Affairs force. First,

most civilian agencies, although quick to respond, have a slower response time compared to Civil Affairs forces. Second, Civil Affairs forces as part of the military establishment have the organic ability to provide security for themselves and the operating area. Finally, Civil Affairs forces have unique capabilities such as rotary lift, all terrain tracked and wheeled vehicles and individual Soldier resilience to a harsh operating environment.

CHAPTER 2: AFRICOM Strategy for the Civil Affairs Force Development

The argument is thus presented that development of Civil Affairs forces in African militaries is justified by the requirements of the African environment and the unique capability African Civil Affairs forces could bring to response and mitigation of natural disasters and migratory crises. Moving forward from this conclusion, this paper will recommend a strategy for incorporation into the AFRICOM Theater Campaign plan. This overall strategy is labeled “African CA force development” for purposes of unifying all strategy elements.

Theater Campaign Plan Recommendations

The strategy for African CA force development must be integrated into the AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan to ensure coordination of activities and integration with the directed tasks from the Secretary of Defense. This paper has highlighted the philosophy behind the African CA Force Development strategy and its how it is nested with the NSS, NMS and AFRICOM Theater Strategy. Translating thought to action is the role of the Operational Commander, in this case General Ham, the AFRICOM Commander. General Ham must take the nested strategy and translate it into implementable actions coordinated with DoS and African partner nations. The form this translation takes is the AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). This paper suggests the following modifications to the current AFRICOM TCP to support African CA Force Development:

Intermediate Military Objective: *Establish Civil Affairs capability in the African Standby Force (ASF) to reduce partner dependence on U.S. military assistance during civil emergencies or migratory crises.*

Supporting tasks:

- a. Identify three partner nations per region for potential CA force development.
- b. Advocate to A.U. to modify ASF operational scenarios and adjust force structure to transform one Infantry Company to a Civil Affairs company per regional brigade.
- c. Conduct engagement with selected partner nations to coordinate CA force development.
- d. Through and with partner nations, narrate and demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of African Civil Affairs force.
- e. Establish an African Civil Affairs Center of Excellence
- f. Coordinate with IOs and NGOs in partner nations or regions to integrate African CA forces into current and planned operations.
- g. Develop and submit RFF for 1 x CA training battalion for six-month deployment.
- h. Coordinate with DoS African Bureau and Country Teams to secure identified partner nation-training facilities.
- i. Develop CA Partner Military Training (PMET) exercises in the annual theater exercise plan.
- j. Coordinate Foreign Military Sales support to African CA force development.

Partner Nation CA Force Development Candidate Selection Process

The African CA Force Development strategy will analyze, identify and select three nations per African sub region for CA force development. One candidate is probably insufficient given the unique systemic conditions in each nation and region. If AFRICOM can identify three candidates in each sub region, then it would allow for adjudication with other U.S. military or civilian engagement activities in the nation to determine the most optimal fit for CA force development. Each nation would then be prioritized to begin engagement with the partner nations to determine which nation will be the final candidate. Once each primary candidate is

selected, the African CA force development process will entail: creation of force structure in the African Standby Force, development of an Africa based U.S. Army Civil Affairs training center, selection, equipping and training of the initial African CA force, and development of an enduring CA training and exercise partnership.

The partner nation selection process can begin using the RCA modeled here in this paper. This paper has already identified four compelling candidates in four of the five regions: Ghana in Western Africa, Cameroon in Central Africa, Kenya in East Africa, and Botswana in Southern Africa. The only candidate that was identified as marginal was Morocco in Northern Africa. The analysis of these five nations was focused on the viability of the RCA model and more work is necessary to identify remaining candidates in each region.

African Standby Force Structure

Adopted by the Third Session of African Chiefs of Defence Staff on 15-16 May 2003 and noted by the Heads of State and Government at the Maputo Summit in July 2003, the A.S.F. was established with five regional brigades in the North, South, East, West, and Central regions of Africa. The mandate of these brigades was to have the capability to respond to the scenarios identified in Figure 4.¹ This mandate will require revision and adoption by the A.U. to include two additional scenarios involving Disaster Relief and Dislocated Civilian Operations, which are highlighted as recommended scenarios 7 and 8 in figure 4. Given that it is unlikely additional force structure would be added to the current standby brigades, the A.U will have to make a decision on where other structure can be reduced in favor of development of a recommended Civil Affairs Company in each brigade. Given the current structure of these nascent brigades,

¹ African Union, "African Standby Force," African Union, <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/asf/Documents.htm> (accessed 30 November 2011).

the feasible cut in force structure would come from the infantry battalions identified to support brigade missions.

Scenario	Description	Deployment requirement. <i>(from mandate resolution)</i>
1	A.U./Regional military advice to a political mission.	30 days
2	A.U./Regional observer mission co-deployed with a U.N. mission.	30 days
3	Stand-alone A.U./Regional observer mission.	30 days
4	A.U./Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building).	30 days
5	A.U. Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers.	90 days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.
6	A.U. intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.	14 days with robust military force
7	A.U./Regional Disaster Response	90 days
8	A.U. Dislocated Civilian Response force co-deployed with a U.N.H.C.R. mission	30 Days

Figure 4 ASF Response Scenarios

African Civil Affairs Center of Excellence (COE)

The training of this proposed African Civil Affairs structure would require U.S. training areas and facilities in Africa, preferable in the candidate nations. The challenge of establishing and maintaining the proposed African Civil Affairs Center of Excellence indicates that it is more suitable to U.S. forces as the lead. Given AFRICOM's structured security engagement in the region, this paper argues that AFRICOM should set "Establish and maintain an African Civil Affairs Center of Excellence" as a supporting task to its CA Force Development objective in its Theater Campaign Plan.

This Center of Excellence would require a forward operating base in the candidate nation for a period of six months; one month for preparation of the training school and one month each

for all five new African CA companies. This temporary training center would allow enough time for initial CA training and education without creating negatively perceived permanent infrastructure. The bases selected for this initial training also would likely be good locations for the enduring CA follow on training conducted throughout the year as part of AFRICOM's security cooperation activities.

African CA Force Structure Model

Once force structure is allocated within the African Standby Force, a decision is necessary on the type of structure of the African CA forces. This paper presents two options the N.A.T.O. CIMIC and the U.S. Army CA force structure models. Option one would be an African CIMIC group tailored to each nation, but with some common elements modeled after the N.A.T.O. CIMIC group. The African CA force under this model would be similar to a N.A.T.O. CIMIC Deployable Module (DM).² The DM would provide operational, planning and liaison capability. Although the CIMIC structure would be tailored to each nation, a notional CIMIC DM is illustrated in this paper to provide a basis of comparison with the U.S. CA force model.

The notional 27 person CIMIC DM would consist of five elements: Command Post, Functional Specialty, CIMIC Center, Recce, Project Management, and Liaison. The Command Post element consists of five individuals to provide command and control for the DM; Commander, Deputy, Logistics specialist, communications specialist, and civil information specialist. Next would be a four person functional specialty team consisting of one Civil Infrastructure specialist with expertise in transportation, one Civil Infrastructure specialist with expertise in Emergency Services, one Humanitarian Affairs specialist with expertise in Refugee

² Civil-Military Center of Excellence, "CIMIC Field Handbook," Civil-Military Center of Excellence, <http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/cfh/CIMIC-Handbook.pdf> (accessed December 11, 2011), p.10.

Affairs, two Humanitarian Affairs specialists with expertise in Medical Affairs. The two-person CIMIC Center element would “validate civilian requests for support and the prioritization of assistance efforts, while eliminating duplication of efforts.”³ There would be three four person Recce elements “to patrol the Area of Operations (AOO), either alone or in cooperation with other units in order to verify and collect information about the civil situation or possible CIMIC-related tasks/projects; and to contribute to all assessments.”⁴ These Recce elements can be further attached to ASF subordinate military commanders in the AOO. The two-person Project Management element would “staff and manage potential projects. Upon approval the Project Management element will execute, monitor and document the entire project process.”⁵ The two-person Civil Liaison element would establish and maintain contact with representatives of the local population and establish relationships with the IO/NGO/GO community in order to establish rapport and gain the necessary personal trust.⁶

The African Civil Affairs Company could also be modeled after the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Company structure depicted in Figure 5.




Figure 5 U.S. Army Civil Affairs Company Structure⁷

³ Ibid, p.15.

⁴ Ibid, p.14.

⁵ Ibid, p.15.

⁶ Ibid, p.14.

⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Civil Affairs Operations,” Department of the Army FM 3-05.40, September 2006, p. 22.

This proposed thirty-two person CA Company in Figure 6 would be composed of five, four person Civil Affairs Teams (CATs), a six-person Headquarters Section and a six-person Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) team. The CATs can be split off and attached to ASF infantry battalions who may be operating in different areas. This Company would have the capability to conduct Civil Reconnaissance⁸ and plan, coordinate, and enable Civil Affairs Operations. The Company could also provide a standing CMOC capability with generalist expertise in public health, public works, and public safety. This CMOC could also provide tactical-level planning, management, coordination, and synchronization of key Civil Military Operations within the supported commander's area of operation.⁹




Figure 6 Proposed African CA Company

⁸ Ibid, Glossary-10, *Civil Reconnaissance*: A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by Civil Affairs or by other forces, as required. Also known as CR.

⁹ Ibid, p. 2-22.

AFRICOM could work with N.A.T.O. to leverage CIMIC capable N.A.T.O. partners to assist in conducting Civil Affairs training. These N.A.T.O. partners could provide a valuable contribution to civil military force development. There are two tensions related to N.A.T.O. involvement in theater security steady state engagement with African nations. First, N.A.T.O. nations like U.K., France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, and Germany all have colonial ties to Africa. These ties are not exclusively negative but create potential obstacles to African partner nation acceptance of N.A.T.O. support. Second, N.A.T.O.'s military actions are governed by a common defense treaty, which applies to actual or perceived threats to member nations. This defensive nature has been stretched a bit to accommodate their involvement in ISAF and the Libyan conflict, but steady state military deployments would require a new N.A.T.O. policy, which this paper argues is not feasible. So, given that the preponderance of training would likely be executed by U.S. forces, this paper argues that the 32-person U.S. CA Company structure be the approved structure for this African CA force development. U.S. CA forces have very limited knowledge and experience operating in the N.A.T.O. CIMIC construct and it would make teaching this construct very problematic. Quite simply the benefits of implementing the N.A.T.O. CIMIC force structure do not outweigh the deficient training that would result from U.S. CA forces training N.A.T.O. CIMIC doctrine to inexperienced African CA Soldiers.

Initial African CA Selection, Training, and Equipping

The African CA Center of Excellence could be established initially by United States Army Reserve (USAR) training battalions, which specialize in conducting CA Advanced Individual Training and Professional Military Education for U.S.A.R. CA Soldiers here in the United States. These units could modify the current U.S. Civil Affairs Military Occupation

Specialty (MOS) transition course to meet the requirements unique to the African armed forces. This African CA force development requirement is structured in a manner conducive to the activation and deployment policies dictated to the U.S.A.R. by United States Code Title 10. Specifically, the initial training cycle of all five African CA companies would be conducted under partial mobilization authority for a period of one year and the annual refresher training will be conducted through a twenty-nine day Annual Training exercise authority.¹⁰

The proposed four-week initial training cycle for African CA Soldiers would be prefaced by identification and selection of an infantry unit of at least the required 27-person or 32-person size to be transitioned to Civil Affairs Soldiers. In each candidate nation it is important to identify infantry units for transition, which have regional ties to routinely affected areas of the nation or experience in Disaster Relief or Dislocated Civilian Operations. The regional ties will improve communication links with the civilian population. The previous “Civil Affairs like” experience of these infantry units will provide invaluable context to the structured CA tactics instruction in the initial training cycle.

Civil Affairs forces operate in a civil military environment characterized by urgent and immediate needs of a civilian population that is in the midst of a traumatic event. As individuals orient their way through this crisis environment they become very focused on meeting the basic needs of themselves and their family members. This focus creates an insular psychological outlook that requires them to extend a level of patience and trust towards those that are granting them aid. First and foremost among these basic needs is personal security. One must be able to put theirs and their families’ lives in the hands of civil military groups offering assistance. They

¹⁰ United States House of Representatives, “10 U.S.C Chapter 1007 – Administration of Reserve Components,” United States HoU.S.e of Representatives, (Washington DC: 2011), <http://U.S.code.house.gov/download/pls/10C1007.txt> (accessed December 7, 2011).

must perceive their helpers as competent and trustworthy. U.S. Civil Affairs forces are specifically recruited and trained to demonstrate these characteristics and it would be a key recruiting and training element for African Civil Affairs forces.

It is the opinion of the author that in addition to curriculum detailed below, additional hours must be integrated into the initial training schedule to improve verbal and written communication skills for African CA Soldiers. So much of the success of CA Soldiers depends not just on action, but on the method and manner of the communication between the CA Soldiers and the affected population. Given the lack of familiarity with this type of communication between the military and the population it will require extensive instruction and repetition through this four week training cycle.

The author proposes a four-week training cycle for each new African CA Company. This initial training is divided into four key topic areas: Civil Affairs Foundations, the Mechanics of Civil Military Operations Centers, the Mechanism for Execution of the CA functions of Disaster Relief, and the Mechanics of Dislocated Civilian Operations. The objective of this initial four-week training is a minimum operating capacity in the three functions of conducting Civil Military Operations Center operations, conducting military support to Disaster Relief operations and Dislocated Civilian operations. This objective will be achieved through classroom study followed by extensive practicum in each area.

Equipping these African CA Soldiers would be a small cost, as the Soldiers should already be equipped with uniforms and basic equipment from their initial training as infantry Soldiers. Any additional CA specific equipment, primarily communications equipment, could be funded through coordinated interagency Foreign Military Sales.

Enduring CA Partner Training

For the follow on African CA training a potentially effective technique would involve an enduring partnership structure similar to techniques used by the U.S. Army National Guard in its State Partnership Program (SPP). “The SPP establishes enduring and mutually beneficial partnerships between foreign countries and American States through the National Guard.”¹¹ Interestingly enough, three of the seven NG partner nations already established are Morocco, Ghana and Botswana. This established SPP with these nations could be additionally beneficial criteria when conducting the RCA and identifying candidate countries.

USAR CA Companies could develop partnerships with the African CA Companies. This enduring partnership mitigates the impact of the rotation into and out of African partner militaries based on short term enlistments. As a function of this partnership the USAR CA Companies could return on annual basis for progressively more challenging CA training activities combined with real world exercises in the candidate nation or its region. In between annual training events the USAR and African CA partners, could exchange information virtually on the latest tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting Civil Affairs Activities.

These annual training exercises would be driven by the objectives in the AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan and structured in a similar fashion to current theater security cooperation activities such as medical readiness and training exercises (MEDRETEs). Foreign Military Training events could be codified as Partner Military Training Exercises (PMETs.) The different nomenclature reinforces the aforementioned philosophy of partner development. PMETs could pair one U.S. CAT with one partner CAT for a two week cycle and given a mission to conduct

¹¹ Headquarters, U.S. Army National Guard, “State Partnership Program,” U.S. Army National Guard G1, https://g1armg.army.pentagon.mil/Partners/SPP/Documents/State_Partnership_Program_Final.pdf (accessed December 11,2011).

civil reconnaissance of real world refugee or dislocated civilian areas, or possibly conduct meetings and evaluations of local area preparation and mitigation plans for natural disasters.

DOTMLPF for U.S. CA Forces

Executing this paper's recommended development of African Civil Affairs forces will affect U.S. CA forces primarily in the areas of Doctrine, Training, and Leadership and Education. These areas will likely require no additional funding during preparation and execution of this African CA force development. This point is relevant given the current and near-term projections of reduced funding to the Department of Defense budget. After detailing the effects on Doctrine, Training, and Leadership and Education, this section will conclude with a discussion of how current or reduced funding levels are sufficient to execute this proposal.

Doctrine

Doctrine provides the foundation for the manner in which the U.S. military executes its responsibilities. The Army in particular writes and utilizes doctrine to the greatest extent of all the military service branches. Army doctrine provides the framework for initial and sustainment training and the point from which U.S. Soldiers can adapt their methods to meet the challenges of a complex operating environment. Therefore to deviate in a positive manner toward successful execution of tactical activities, Soldiers must understand how they should execute in accordance with doctrine.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs doctrine is encompassed in two primary manuals, Field Manual 3.05-40, and Field Manual 3.05-401. Field Manual 3.05-40 provides the structure and core functions of Civil Affairs Operations, while the other manual provides detailed tactics, techniques and procedures learned through training and execution of Civil Affairs missions in

the two years following publication of FM 3.05-40. This is a living and fluid process and much more will be added to this doctrine as the lessons observed from the past decade of combat deployments are codified. However, the area not covered by codified doctrine or lessons observed is the methods for using U.S. CA forces as trainers and mentors for foreign military CA forces.

The author recommends an additional sub task under the Civil Affairs core function of Nation Assistance in FM 3.05-40 to be labeled “Foreign Military Training (FMT).” FMT as proposed is *the activities of U.S. Civil Affairs forces to coordinate with U.S. Government agency and Host Nation partners to establish, train and develop Civil Affairs operational capability in the Host Nation armed forces. This Host Nation Civil Affairs force would be trained and developed using U.S. Civil Affairs core functions as a base which is tailored to the unique requirements of the Host Nation. The important underlying framework of this Host Nation Civil Affairs force development is to improve the capability of the Host Nation to respond quickly and effectively to Civil Military Operations missions in its nation and the region. This response supports the development of independent Host Nation activities which enhance stability in its nation and region, and reduce the demand for U.S. Civil Affairs forces to conduct these missions.*

Training

The area of training will require the most significant adjustment to implement this paper’s proposals. Currently we train our CA forces to be the most proficient executors, coordinators, and facilitators in a Civil Military Operations environment. This is not a bad thing, as supported maneuver commanders will still require this capability in the future. However, this singular focus inculcates a belief that to be done right U.S. CA forces must conduct all CA operations. The U.S. Government policy, planning guidance, and the AFRICOM Commander’s

Intent state that our future security environment will be dominated by Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) phase 0 activities. Phase 0 activities are steady state and the main effort of Combatant Commands. These activities shape the operational environment to support prevention and deterrence of future conflict and if necessary support more effective execution of Joint Operations in the operating area.

This phase 0 environment is the ideal time to develop the capacity of partner nation militaries to defend their nation's interests. It is permissive, less violent and less urgent than those activities in phase 3 of Joint Operations. In another way, phase 0 is the best investment to ensure success in the future. This success by partner nations increases stability and secondarily supports the end state conditions desired by United States National Security Strategy. U.S. CA forces need to restructure their training to prepare to execute partner nation capacity development.

After basic instruction on FMT conducted during initial training and Professional Military Education, Commanders must incorporate a Mission Essential Task (MET) into their training strategy to focus on FMT. This MET could read, "Conduct Foreign Military Training." Supporting tasks to this MET could be:

- Tailor CA core functions to HN environmental requirements
- Evaluate education requirements of targeted CA forces
- Develop tailored CA function Program of Instruction (POI)
- Establish training site
- Execute tailored CA force training
- Conduct assessment of the development of HN CA force capabilities

These supporting tasks could be integrated into the unit's training plan and culminate with an assessment during a multi echelon training exercise. An example of this described process was observed during the United States Army Reserve 413th CA Battalion's pre-

deployment training exercise entitled OPERATION PLAINS ASSISTANCE (OPA). OPA was structured to have each CAT rotate through various training scenarios for evaluation. Each scenario was set up to assess the CAT on the likely CA core functions to be executed during a deployment to Afghanistan. In order to expand the breadth of the training a FMT scenario was integrated into the exercise.

During this FMT scenario, a U.S. CAT was paired with a foreign CAT (played by role players). The U.S. CAT was instructed that their partner CAT was newly formed and had no CA training or experience. The U.S. CAT was told to evaluate the team, quickly develop a POI and execute a training regime for the foreign CAT to prepare them to assist the U.S. CAT during upcoming CA operations in the exercise operating environment. This completely novel training scenario tested the viability of the supporting FMT tasks mentioned previously. The U.S. CATs responded to these ambiguous and new scenarios quite well and were able in a time constrained period of six hours to conduct FMT sufficiently to shape future CA operations into U.S./Partner nation CA operations.

Leadership and Education

Civil Affairs institutional training will require modification to implement this paper's recommendation. The goal of this modification is to teach and inculcate in U.S. CA leaders a philosophy which promotes the execution of CA operations by partners. A belief that if partner nations can execute CA operations emulating the success of U.S. CA forces it is a positive evolution for the Civil Affairs community. A recommended approach to this leadership education during Professional Military Education (PME) is a comprehensive introduction of FMT as the premier CA task of the next generation of CA operators. This introduction could include simultaneous publication of the revised doctrine and corresponding updated training

guidance and Commander focus during training oversight. The leaders of the U.S. CA community from CAT to battalion level must understand the importance of this new evolution of Civil Affairs and its role in preventing another overwhelming decade of conflict.

CONCLUSION

A unique window of opportunity exists in which a recognition of the important role of capable military partners and the establishment of a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) exclusively focused on Africa have fostered a much-needed debate about ways to protect U.S. global interests in a fiscally constrained environment with a military stretched to its limit by a decade of combat. While some GCCs have had access to many military resources, most have had to develop methods for accomplishing objectives through indirect approaches. AFRICOM despite its small structure and allocation of forces faces enormous requirements in its AOR. Natural Disasters and migratory crises are a daily issue in the region and impact its ability to stabilize the region and support its safe and secure economic, political and social development.

This demand for action forces AFRICOM to develop its partner militaries in the region to respond to security threats. Up to this point in AFRICOM's development, most of the effort centered on developing partnership capacity related to countering terrorism in the region. The Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism Initiative and OEF-Trans Sahel have made excellent progress in disrupting the destructive activities of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) who use Africa as a base of operations and support. This paper cannot refute the applicability and necessity of these initiatives, but instead advocates adding a Civil Affairs capability to the African Standby Force. This CA force could begin to respond nationally and regionally to destabilizing events that foster VEO development with organic African military forces. Successful response by African CA forces to these destabilizing events will reduce support to VEOs in the region and also reduce the demand signal for U.S. military forces to respond. An additional benefit of this approach is the strengthening self-sufficiency within national and regional African communities

and quieting the dichotomy in the minds of many Africans that demand independence from external actors, but realize that without them they will not develop and reach their goals.

The paper proposes a model for determining the potential value of developing CA forces, which is called the Requirements Capacity Analysis (RCA). This RCA model was applied to case studies of five African nations from the five sub regions of Africa. By applying this model to each case study two things were apparent. First, the RCA model is an effective analysis tool to determine candidates for development of CA forces. Second, the RCA model informs a larger theater strategy for implementation.

The RCA model indicates that Morocco is a marginal candidate for CA force development and Ghana, Botswana, Kenya, and Cameroon are compelling candidates for the development of CA forces. Through this RCA analysis a great deal of situational understanding was gained in each nation and region, which can inform execution of CA force development activities in the future. However, it was also clear that despite the compelling nature of many of these case study nations redundant analysis of other nations in each region should achieve the goal of having three prioritized candidates from each region.

To synchronize CA development with other engagement activities in the AOR the author recommends incorporation of a new objective, with sub tasks, into the AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan. This objective is stated as: *establish Civil Affairs capability in the African Standby Force (ASF) to reduce partner dependence on U.S. military assistance during civil emergencies or migratory crises*. This objective recognizes the potential of transforming the existing military structure in the African Standby Force to accommodate CA structure and

function. The sub tasks highlight the complex nature of African CA force development and the necessary political military integration with DoS.

After looking at both U.S. and N.A.T.O. CA and CIMIC forces, the paper concludes that U.S. CA forces and specifically, U.S. Army Reserve CA forces, would provide the best model for African CA forces. Additionally, U.S. Army Reserve CA forces could be integral in conducting the initial and enduring training of African CA forces. Executing this strategy will have an impact on U.S. Army CA Doctrine, Training, Leadership and Education. Fortunately, given the U.S. Defense fiscal constraints anticipated in the near future, all of these impacts can be resolved with little to no additional outlays. They will just require changes to publications, programs of instruction and Army leadership focus.

Finally, further research will be needed to examine the impacts of the “Arab Spring” and the global economic crisis on African partner nations. These impacts could potentially alter the validity of the RCA model, requiring modification of the model or wholesale revision. As this strategy is executed, new learning will occur on the impact of these new African CA forces that could result in innovative techniques for conducting CA activities or indicate potential effects in unanticipated areas. AFRICOM should develop a process for sharing, learning and implementing new changes across the concerned partner and interagency actors.

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